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We develop a formal model in which the government provides public goods in different 
policy fields for its citizens. We start from the basic premise that two office-motivated 
candidates have differential capabilities in different policy fields, and compete by proposing 
how to allocate government resources to those fields. 
The model has a unique equilibrium that differs substantially from the standard median-voter 
model. While candidates compete for the support of a moderate voter type, this cutoff voter 
differs from the expected median voter. Moreover, no voter type except the cutoff voter is 
indifferent between the candidates in equilibrium. The model also predicts that candidates 
respond to changes in the preferences of voters in a very rigid way. We also analyze under 
which conditions candidates choose to strengthen the issue in which they have a competence 
advantage, and when they rather compensate for their weakness. 
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This is a thoroughly revised version of a paper previously entitled “A formal model of issue 
ownership”. 1 Introduction
In his seminal work “An economic theory of democracy,” Anthony Downs (1957) develops a model of
two-party electoral competition and shows that candidates’ platforms converge to the preferences of the
median voter. This median voter model has become the standard framework through which scholars typ-
ically study electoral competition; even analyses set to show that candidates platforms diverge typically
use the Downsian setting as their starting point.
An implicit assumption in nearly all of the formal works based on Downs standard model is that
candidates have equal ability to implement the policies proposed during the electoral campaign. Yet,
candidates in elections frequently diﬀer in their personal background, professional expertise, and the
set of key aides whom they would rely on if elected, and consequently, the electorate perceives each
candidate as having diﬀerent strengths and weaknesses in certain policy areas relative to his opponent.
We develop a model of electoral competition between candidates who have diﬀerent abilities in
implementing two diﬀerent public goods such as national security and education. In our model, each
candidate proposes how to allocate a ﬁxed total amount of money (or eﬀort) between the two goods,
and the resource allocation together with the winner’s exogenous ability determine the amount of pub-
lic goods provided to the voters. Voters diﬀer in the intensity with which they care about the relative
provision of the goods and vote for their respective preferred candidates.
The model advances our understanding of electoral competition by providing a framework that cap-
tures the following observations: First, candidates/parties compete ﬁercely for the support of certain
“moderate” voters, by proposing platforms designed to appeal to these voters. Second, in contrast to
these moderate voters who are almost indiﬀerent between parties, most voters have strict preferences for
one of the two candidates. Third, competing candidates often do not just diﬀer in exogenous charac-
teristics, but also choose policy platforms that diﬀer from their opponent’s platform. Fourth, from an
ex-ante perspective, candidates often have substantially diﬀerent winning probabilities. Fifth, candidate
platforms sometimes display a surprisingly strong rigidity with respect to new information about the
distribution of voter preferences.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section contains an informal discussion of the causes of
diﬀerences in candidate ability, and an informal and intuitive description of our results. The relation
of our paper to previous literature is detailed in Section 3. Section 4 describes our formal model, and
Section 5 contains the analysis of the equilibrium which can be done for the most part using graphics. In
Section 6, we discuss several extensions; in particular, we provide some arguments showing that parties
have an incentive to ﬁeld candidates with diﬀerentiated expertise. Section 7 concludes. Some proofs and
more general theorems are in the Appendix.
22 Causes and consequences of heterogeneous candidate abilities
2.1 Policy areas and diﬀerences between candidates.
Our model focuses on policy areas that Stokes (1963) calls valence issues. That is, all voters in our
model agree that a higher output in both public goods (say, a low crime rate, the quality of schooling
etc.) is desirable. However, they diﬀer on which trade-oﬀs they are willing to make between these
diﬀerent political goals. The key departure of our model from previous literature is that we assume that
candidates have diﬀerential abilities in the diﬀerent policy areas. To keep our model simple, we abstract
from horizontal issues that Stokes (1963) calls “position issues”, i.e. policy questions like abortion, gay
marriage or gun control in which voters disagree over the desired outcome, and in which the issue of
“implementation ability” is evidently less important.
There are several intuitive reasons why candidates (or parties, depending on the unit of analysis) have
diﬀerent abilities in diﬀerent policy areas. First, individual candidates already have a background (e.g.
education, experience, personal interests) when they enter politics and such personal background may tilt
their interests toward some policy issues rather than others. When business leaders run for elected oﬃce,
they usually highlight their management experience as a reason to expect a competent management of
government from them. Likewise, candidates with a military background often leverage their experience
on military and foreign aﬀairs issues, and focus their policy proposals on this area.
Second, once in oﬃce, individuals may choose to work on those issues in which they are more
capable and such self-selection further reinforces whatever initial competence the candidate brings on
those speciﬁc policy issues. For example, it is plausible that Franklin Delano Roosevelt, after having
startedtheNewDealprograminhisﬁrstterm, wasconsideredmorecompetentinmanagingamoreactive
government involvement in the economy than any Republican challenger. Similarly, George W. Bush
successfully leveraged his experience in ﬁghting the “war on terror” in his 2004 reelection campaign.1
Third, based on diﬀerent backgrounds and preferences, self-sorting of citizens into parties may oc-
cur: Prior to becoming candidates, individuals start out as citizens with certain policy preferences. If an
individual has a stronger than average preference for national defense, it is natural that he will be more
interested in foreign relations or defense technology (relative to another individual who is more con-
cerned with, say, education). Over time, his competence on defense-related matters will increase, while
his competence on education-related matters will be weaker than that of an individual who cares more
about education. Moreover, it is not only natural that these individuals will join diﬀerent parties that are
composed from individuals with similar preferences — very likely, there is also a career-incentive for
aspiring politicians to self-select into the appropriate party because an individual’s speciﬁc competence
for, say, national defense is more appreciated by the members and primary voters of the Republican party.
1Note that the decisive point for electoral success is always the level of competence perceived by the electorate rather than
the actual level.
3Forth, and complementary to the third explanation, parties can be seen as networks whose members
cooperate in the provision of government services. If, for whatever reasons, one party has attracted most
individuals with speciﬁc knowledge about one policy area, then an elected candidate from this party can
draw on this network of knowledgeable party members to provide both speciﬁc new ideas and to recruit
key personnel for government positions. In contrast, if the competitor from the other party is elected,
then he cannot draw on these network resources, and his ability to optimally implement policy in this
policy ﬁeld is diminished. In this way, the ideological predisposition of party members may inﬂuence
what policies their candidate is able to oﬀer (in the sense of capability), and, in addition, which policy
(i.e., budget allocation) their candidate will choose.
In the standard model, competence is sometimes incorporated as an additive “valence” component.
However, since valence enters voters’ utility functions in a way that is separable from which policy is
implemented, it does not capture the notion of issue-speciﬁc ability, which lies at the core of our model.
For example, military experience is electorally more valuable for a candidate when international conﬂict
is a serious concern for voters than when they are mostly concerned with economic issues.
2.2 Heterogeneous candidates competing for voters.
In our model, the executive has to choose which proportion of the government budget to spend on two
public goods, such as education and law enforcement, or domestic and foreign policy. The resources
spent on each ﬁeld in combination with the executive’s skill in each ﬁeld translate into amounts of public
goods 0 and 1 provided. During the election campaign, each candidate proposes a budget allocation
(or, equivalently, a combination of goods 0 and 1 from his own production possibility set). There is a
continuum of voters who care diﬀerentially about the diﬀerent goods, ranging from those who almost
only care about good 0 over those who care about both to ones that care almost exclusively about good 1.
If both candidates have identical abilities in our framework, then the median voter (i.e., the voter who
has the property that half of the electorate cares more about good 1 relative to good 0 than this voter,
and the other half of the electorate cares less about good 1 relative to good 0 than this voter) is decisive
for the election outcome, and both candidates propose a policy that maximizes the utility of the median
median voter. (Candidates in our model are uncertain about the exact preferences of the median voter so
that they have to cater to the “median median” voter, that is, the median realization of the median voter).
Since both candidates propose the same policy, all voters are indiﬀerent between the candidates.
The assumption that candidates have heterogeneous abilities substantially changes the nature of elec-
toralcompetitionrelativetothestandardmodel. Eachcandidatehasanaturaltargetaudience, inthesense
that he has an advantage in appealing to these voters.2 Assume for the moment that candidates do not
2While we assume that candidates are exogenously diﬀerentiated in the basic model, in Section 6.1, we allow parties to
choose the characteristics of their nominees and show that they have very robust incentives to choose a candidate whose
capabilities diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those of the opposition candidate.
4“overcompensate” with their equilibrium budget allocations, i.e., the candidate who has a productivity
advantage in the production of good 0 ends up producing more of good 0 than his competitor, and vice
versa for good 1 (our formal model shows that “no overcompensation” is in fact a property of equilib-
rium). In this case, voters who care primarily about Candidate 0’s strong good vote for Candidate 0, and
those voters who care primarily about Candidate 1’s strong good vote for Candidate 1. In between the
extremes is a moderate “cutoﬀ” voter type who is indiﬀerent between candidates. We show that both
candidates choose their platforms so as to maximize the cutoﬀ voter’s utility.
The equilibrium has a number of appealing properties that distinguish it from the standard model and
other existing models such as the probabilistic voting model and the citizen-candidate model.
Competition for the cutoﬀ voter’s support. Just as in the Downsian model with oﬃce motivated
candidates, in our model, there exists one voter type whose utility both candidates maximize. However,
the similarity between the models ends there: In the Downsian model, this type is always the median
(or median median) voter. In our model, the location of this voter, which we refer to as the cutoﬀ voter,
depends solely on the diﬀerential abilities of the candidates (and will in general not coincide with the
median). Furthermore, unlike in the Downsian model, our candidates oﬀer diﬀerent policies and only
the cutoﬀ voter is indiﬀerent while all other voters have a strict preferences. All other voters have a strict
preference for one of the two candidates. Thus, our model can reconcile the notion that candidates in an
election campaign compete ﬁercely for the support of some “moderate” voters with the observation that,
in most elections, many voters feel passionately that there is a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between candidates.
Distribution independence and rigidity. In the standard model, the position of the candidates’ plat-
forms depend decisively on the distribution of voter preferences and, in particular, the likely position
of the median voter. In contrast, the equilibrium platforms of candidates in our framework depend ex-
clusively on candidate skills and properties of the utility function, but not on the voter type distribution.
Thus, thereisamarkedcontrastbetweenthestandardmodelandourswithrespecttotheeﬀectofchanges
in the voter distribution (or, of better information about the voter distribution).
Policy divergence. In our model, there is always policy divergence in terms of outcomes (i.e., in terms
of the bundle of goods that the two candidates would provide), but the actual “output” may often be
impossible to measure. For example, the “level of national security” provided by a candidate is diﬃcult
to measure objectively by an outside observer, while spending on national security related items is clearly
deﬁned. Thus, another empirically relevant concept of divergence is platform divergence, i.e., whether
the two candidates propose a diﬀerent budget allocation. Except for special cases, the equilibrium also
features platform divergence in our model.3
3The ﬁrst exception is if both candidates have exactly the same abilities, which renders the model equivalent to the standard
model with convergence to the expected median’s preferred position; the second exception is if voters have an elasticity of
52.3 Predictions and comparison with existing models
The assumption that candidates are purely oﬃce-motivated generates policy convergence and indiﬀer-
ence of all voters between the candidates in the Downsian framework. It is thus surprising that our
model, which shares the assumption of oﬃce-motivated candidates, leads to policy divergence and strict
voter preferences. Moreover, while some superﬁcially similar results can be obtained in variations of the
standard framework, our model oﬀers qualitatively new insights.
The nature of policy divergence. The platform choice of candidates for political oﬃce is one of the
major areas of interest in formal models of politics. There is a huge literature on the topic of policy
convergence or divergence in one-dimensional models (or models with one policy dimension and one
valence dimension). For excellent reviews of this area, see, e.g., Osborne (1995), Roemer (2001) and
Grofman (2004).
Policy divergence can be obtained in the Downsian framework by assuming that candidates are
policy-motivated(Wittman(1983); Calvert(1985); Roemer(1994); Groseclose(2001); Martinelli(2001)).
In this type of model, divergence away from the opponent’s position reduces a candidate’s winning prob-
ability, but increases his utility in case of a victory. This trade-oﬀ should be aﬀected by a number of
exogenous factors. First, better information quality about the position of the median voter translates into
less policy divergence. Second, information arrival (for example, opinion polls conducted during the
campaign) should induce candidates to adjust their positions. Third, policy divergence should be less
pronounced when winning oﬃce becomes more attractive (say, a more prestigious oﬃce, or an oﬃce in
which the oﬃce holder receives a higher salary).
In contrast, in our model, the candidates choose a level of policy divergence that maximizes their
respective winning probabilities, and none of the factors discussed above would change the candidates’
equilibrium policy positions. For example, candidates in our model “stick to their guns” in the face of
shifting voter preferences, because adjusting their platform in the direction of their opponent is not going
to help them electorally: “Moderation”, in the sense of moving closer to the opponent’s proposed budget
allocation, would lose rather than win votes.
The fact that further moderation is a losing electoral strategy does not necessarily imply that it would
be unpopular. It is well possible that a majority of the electorate would “sincerely” prefer that the weaker
candidate’s position becomes more moderate.4 However, these voters with whom moderation is popular
have a strict preference for the opponent that the weaker candidate cannot overcome. In equilibrium,
candidates focus on voters who are close to indiﬀerent between the candidates, and the preferences of
substitution exactly equal to one, i.e. a logarithmic utility function.
4By “sincerely”, we mean that these voters would prefer to be ruled by the weaker candidate with a more moderate position
to being ruled by him with his equilibrium position. What we don’t mean is a voter’s “strategic” preference for the disliked
candidate to take a less electable position.
6these “swing voters” (rather than the majority’s) are decisive for the positions that candidates take.
In our model, candidates care only about their probability of winning, and they are perfectly free
to choose any budget allocation. Thus, the forces that drive divergence in the model cited above (e.g.,
policy motivation) are not present in ours, so that the nature of divergence diﬀers substantially. First,
policy divergence in our model increases rather than decreases a candidate’s probability of winning.
Second, from a normative standpoint, policy divergence is usually negative in standard models, in the
sense that a majority of the population could be made better oﬀ if candidates chose platforms that are
marginally closer to the policy of their opponent. In contrast, our Proposition 3 shows that candidates
converge too much in our model.
Rigidity. If policy divergence arises in a Downsian world, the losing candidate always regrets his
position choice: He could have done better (and maybe even won the election) if he had just chosen
a diﬀerent policy position. In contrast, if a candidate loses in our model because too many voters cared
strongly about the good in which his opponent had an advantage, then there is really nothing that could
have changed the outcome of the vote in a favorable way.
This result corresponds very well to the argument of Petrocik (1996) that “A Democrat’s promise to
attack crime by hiring more police, building more prisons and punishing with longer sentences would
too easily be trumped by greater GOP enthusiasm for such solutions. [...] Candidates respond thus
because [...] to do otherwise would advantage their opponent.” In other words, the weak candidate in a
particular policy area cannot beneﬁt electorally by simply copying the platform of the strong candidate
in this area.
Medium-run stability of party dominance. Our model also provides a framework in which one party
can sustain dominance over the opposition party for an extended period of time. For example, it is gener-
ally acknowledged that the Democrats were the dominant political party from 1932 to 1968. This result
is very diﬃcult to obtain in the standard model: If the position of the median voter shifted towards the
left in 1932, then the standard model implies that candidates of both parties choose more liberal positions
than previously, but a voter preference shift would not translate into more power for the Democrats in the
sense that they win substantially more seats in Congress. To run on a losing platform over and over again
requires a remarkable extent of slow-wittedness in the Downsian framework. Even policy-motivated
candidates (or rather, particularly policy-motivated candidates) should moderate their position in order
to increase their chance of winning, as even the ideologically purest election program is of no use when
the opposition wins. In contrast, in our model, if Republicans cannot successfully imitate the Democrats’
policy position, then sticking with their old platform and hoping for a reversal of the preference shift is
the best (from an electoral perspective) that Republicans can do in the short to medium run. If the prefer-
ence shift is substantial and persistent, a party would have to “re-invent” itself, in the sense of changing
its perceived strengths and weaknesses (i.e., its production function).
7There is currently a lively discussion in the Republican party about whether the party should repo-
sition itself after having lost the 2006 and 2008 national elections. Some party leaders are adamant that
Republicans should not move toward the center. In our model, it is certainly a plausible strategy for
Republicans not to become “Democrats light”, at least until it is clear whether the preference shift is
persistent.
As a further example, consider the Labour Party in the UK which lost power in 1979, plausibly due
to a fundamental and persistent change in the preference distribution of voters (say, more emphasis on
economic growth relative to social justice). In the interpretation of our model, the party is initially stuck
with its previously successful leaders who are specialists in social justice. During this time, we would
expect that party platforms change very little, and the party just hopes that the voters return to their
previous preferences. If this does not happen, popular support for the party is correspondingly reduced.
Over the longer term, however, the party fostered the development of new leaders who specialized more
in being able to deliver on economic growth (while being weaker on social justice). Only when these new
leaders were in place, a corresponding adjustment of the party platform was implemented that eventually
brought the party on track for a return to power.
Valence vs. position issues As we have argued above, our model applies for valence issues (i.e., in
settings where candidates can have diﬀerentiated abilities), while the Downsian model with identical
candidates is a more useful framework for thinking about position issues such as gun control or gay
marriage in which diﬀerences in implementation ability are more-or-less immaterial. This creates a
useful testable implication. Shifts of the voter preference distribution in valence issues should aﬀect
candidates’ positions much less than shifts of the voter distribution in position issues.
Diﬀerences to other models of candidate competition. The properties of equilibrium in our model
also diﬀer from the citizen-candidate model and the probabilistic voting model. In the two-candidate
equilibrium of the citizen-candidate model (see Osborne and Slivinski (1996), Besley and Coate (1997)),
the two candidates locate at the same distance at opposite sides of the median voter’s ideal point. Thus,
while there is equilibrium policy divergence and most voters have strict preferences for one of the candi-
dates, the equilibrium platforms shift with the distribution of voter preferences, and both candidates win
with probability 1=2.
In the probabilistic voting model (Lindbeck and Weibull (1987), Lindbeck and Weibull (1993),
Coughlin (1992), Dixit and Londregan (1996)), voter (groups) diﬀer in their preferences over policy
chosen by the candidates, and individual voters, in addition, have “ideological” preferences for candi-
dates’ immutable characteristics. In equilibrium, both candidates choose a platform that maximizes a
weighted sum of the utilities of all voters, where the weights reﬂect how “movable” certain voter groups
are. Thus, in contrast to our model, the equilibrium of the probabilistic voting model displays policy
convergence. Like in our model, the candidates choose policy not to maximize the utility of the median
8voter; however, in contrast to our model, the determination of the voter type whose utility is maximized
depends crucially on the voter preference distribution.
2.4 Welfare implications
Our model is important for our understanding and interpretation of the results of electoral competition.
In the standard model, policy convergence to the policy preferred by the median appears eﬃcient in the
sense that there is no other policy that a candidate could propose that increases the utility of a majority of
voters. Moreover, to the extent that policy divergence arises in the standard framework (for example, in
the citizen-candidate model), moderation would be beneﬁcial in the sense that, if the winning candidate
implements a policy that departs from his election platform in the direction of his opponent’s platform,
a majority of the electorate beneﬁts. This result has been inﬂuential in shaping the point of view of a
large segment of “moderate” political pundits that moderation and bipartisanship is inherently beneﬁcial
for society. This school of thought is (sometimes satirically) called Broderism (after David Broder of the
Washington Post), deﬁned by the Urban Dictionary as “the worship of bipartisanship for its own sake.”5
Incontrast, inourmodel, amajorityofvotersappreciatesifthewinningcandidatefurtheraccentuates
the policy diﬀerences to his beaten competitor that were the reason for why the winner won the election
in the ﬁrst place. For example, suppose that the Democrat wins the election. This happens if and only
if a majority of voters has preferences that are “more liberal” than those of the cutoﬀ voter (in the
sense of having stronger preferences for those goods that the Democrat has an advantage supplying). In
other words, in his attempt to maximize the set of voter distribution for which he wins the election, the
Democrat caters during the election campaign to a cutoﬀ type that has more conservative preferences
than those of a strict majority of the electorate. A majority of the electorate would therefore be better
oﬀ ex-post if the Democrat provided a more partisan policy than promised in his election platform. Of
course, a symmetric argument shows that, when the Republican wins the election, then a majority of the
electorate prefers a more partisan Republican policy than the cutoﬀ voter.
Clearly, which model is correct has also important implications for our interpretation of institutions
that encourage to “moderation”. Suppose, for example, that the ﬁlibuster rule in the U.S. Senate prevents
Democrats from implementing the strong health insurance reform that they promised during the election
campaign of 2008 and forces them to accept a more watered-down version that is palatable to the most
conservative Democrats and/or the most liberal Republicans. Interpreted in a standard framework, such
enforced moderation may be beneﬁcial as the preferences of the median voter are likely to be somewhere
between the Democratic and the Republican election platforms. In contrast, in our framework, the reason
why Democrats won the elections is that a majority of the electorate favored their platform (and would
be happy with an even more radical reform). Any institutional constraint that prevents Democrats from
implementing their election platform would be detrimental in our framework.
5See http://www.urbandictionary.com/deﬁne.php?term=broderism
93 Related literature
Diﬀerentiated candidate models. A key ingredient of our model is that candidates diﬀer in their pro-
ductivities in diﬀerent policy ﬁelds. Krasa and Polborn (2009a) analyze general models of political com-
petition when candidates have some exogenously diﬀerentiated characteristics, but are free to choose
policy positions on a number of diﬀerent issues. Our model here is built on this general framework, in
which candidates have characteristics and choose policy to maximize their winning probability. Voters
have general preferences over candidate characteristics and policy. Krasa and Polborn (2009a) charac-
terize a class of uniform candidate ranking (UCR) voter preferences that generically lead to policy con-
vergence in equilibrium, even if candidates have diﬀerentiated characteristics. While almost all models
in the existing literature have voters with UCR preferences, voter preferences implied by the candidates’
diﬀerentiated production possibilities in our model do not satisfy UCR, as each candidate has a range of
potential policies in which he is more productive than his opponent. This is the fundamental reason for
equilibrium divergence in the present paper.6
This general framework is also applied in Krasa and Polborn (2009b), which is complementary to
the present paper. In Krasa and Polborn (2009b), two oﬃce-motivated candidates are diﬀerentiated with
respect to their ability to supply small and large quantities of a single public good. Voters diﬀer in
both their income and their taste for public goods, and both parameters inﬂuence their preferences over
tax rates. The main focus is on the determination of equilibrium tax rates and how they vary with the
productivity of the candidates; however, an analysis of spending allocations to diﬀerent policy ﬁelds
is intractable in this framework. In contrast, the present paper focuses on the allocation of money to
diﬀerent policy ﬁelds while taking the level of taxation as exogenous and equal between candidates.
Dixit and Londregan (1996) (henceforth DL) analyze a probabilistic voting model in which candi-
dates choose which transfers to promise to diﬀerent interest groups. Within each group, voters diﬀer in
their ideological predisposition towards the candidates. DL’s main interest is to analyze which factors
determine how successful an interest group will be in attracting transfer payments from candidates. The
part of their model which is related to ours is that they also analyze the eﬀect of diﬀerential candidate
ability to transfer money to diﬀerent interest groups; this is modeled as a candidate- and group-speciﬁc
parameter that determines how much of each dollar transferred gets lost in the process. If both candidates
have the same ability to transfer money to each group, they propose the same vector of transfers to the
diﬀerent interest groups. In contrast, if a candidate has an advantage in transfers to a given interest group
(in the sense that the loss rate is lower than his opponent’s loss rate), then candidates choose to give
higher transfers to the groups for which they have a higher transfer expertise.
6One of the few existing papers with non-UCR preferences and oﬃce-motivated candidates is Adams and Merrill (2003), in
which voters have, in addition to preferences over policy positions from the [0;1] interval, a “non-policy” or partisan preference
for one of the two candidates. Moreover, voters may abstain due to “alienation” (if their preferred candidate does not provide
them with suﬃcient utility). The possibility of abstention generates incentives for equilibrium policy divergence.
10DL also consider heterogeneous candidates, but their main emphasis and results diﬀer substantially
from ours. First and foremost, their focus is on the determinants of a group’s success in competing for
transfer payments, while they assume that general interest policies, i.e. actions that inﬂuence the utility of
allvoters, areexogenouslyﬁxed(theyaresubsumedintheexogenous“ideological”componentofvoters’
utilities); in contrast, we ignore any redistribution and focus on general interest policies (the provision of
diﬀerent public goods). Consequently, the dimension of electoral competition is diﬀerent. In our model,
candidates choose their platforms to compete for the support of a cutoﬀ voter type who is moderately
interested in both public goods, and a main interest of our model is how the cutoﬀ voter is determined and
how his preferences over policy inﬂuence the platforms oﬀered by the candidates. Moreover, voters split
their support according to their preferences over positions chosen by the candidates. In contrast, votersin
DL split (entirely or predominantly) according to the exogenous “ideological” dimension. Because there
is no cutoﬀ voter in the transfer dimension (as all voters only care about transfers to their own group),
the way the policy vector is determined in DL is also completely diﬀerent and depends crucially on the
distribution of ideological preferences in each group. In contrast, in our model, equilibrium policies are
independent of the distribution of voter preferences.
Also, the marginal eﬀects of changing policy in favor of a particular group diﬀer starkly. In DL, if a
candidate oﬀers higher transfers to a group, then the candidate will always pick up more votes from this
group; this eﬀect is, in equilibrium, balanced by vote losses in the other groups whose transfers have to
be reduced accordingly. In contrast, consider the candidate who has an advantage in providing good 0
in our model. If this candidate provides slightly more of good 1 than in equilibrium, this would not win
over any of the supporters of his opponent (who, while they like the direction of the move, still prefer the
opponent), while losing some moderate previous supporters.
Valence models. In most models with exogenously diﬀerentiated candidates, the ﬁxed characteristic
enters additively in all voters’ utility functions and therefore does not change a voter’s ideal policy. When
candidates are oﬃce-motivated as in our model (e.g., Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), Aragones and
Palfrey (2002)), the analysis focuses on a strategic dilemma: On the one hand, the weaker candidate
must avoid to be too close to the location of the stronger candidate, because otherwise all voters prefer
the stronger candidate. On the other hand, the stronger candidate could guarantee a victory if he takes the
same position as his weaker competitor. Thus, in contrast to our model, one candidate has an incentive
to diﬀerentiate, while the other candidate has an incentive to converge to his opponent’s position.
Groseclose(2001)providesaninﬂuentialtheoreticalmodelinwhichcandidatesarepolicy-motivated,
and provides an explanation for the contradictory results in empirical studies of the “marginality hy-
pothesis” that posits that weaker candidates “moderate” their policy position in order to increase their
reelection probability. We discuss this paper in more detail in Section 5.3.
11Issue ownership. After completing this paper, we learned of the independent work of Soubeyran
(2009) who analyzes a special case of our basic model. Like in our model, candidates have diﬀeren-
tiated production functions and allocate money to the production of two diﬀerent goods. Voters are
assumed to have logarithmic utility functions (which is the special case in our model that leads to both
candidates choosing the same observable budget allocation).7
To our knowledge, the only other formal model of issue ownership is Egan (2008). While he fo-
cuses primarily on the empirical side of issue ownership and its implications for the responsiveness of
candidates to shifts in the preference distribution of the electorate, he also develops a short alternative
theory of issue ownership. In his one-dimensional model, the “issue owner” can implement the policy he
promises, while the other candidate can implement his promised policy only with an error. Since voters
are assumed to be risk averse, this implementation error lowers the utility that voters receive from the
issue owner’s competitor. Thus, the policy-motivated issue owner can set his promised policy closer to
his preferred position and still win (the competitor chooses to propose the median voter’s ideal policy,
but loses, since his implementation would be subject to an additional error term).
In a setting where candidates each “own” certain issues, we would expect that candidates focus their
campaign rhetoric on their strong issue and rarely talk about the issue in which they are weaker than
their opponent. This corresponds to what William Riker called the “Dominance Principle” in campaign
rhetoric: “When one side dominates the volume of rhetorical appeals on a particular theme, the other
side abandons appeals on that theme” (Riker (1996), p.6). As a consequence, candidates rarely engage
in “dialogue” in a campaign (Simon (2002)).
4 Model
A polity provides for its citizens two public goods x0 and x1 (e.g., schooling or law enforcement), which
are produced by the administration of the candidate who wins the election. The two candidates j = 0;1
are diﬀerentially productive in providing the two goods and have to choose how much of the govern-
ment’s ﬁxed budget (normalized to 1) to allocate to the production of each public good. Speciﬁcally, if
Candidate j uses a fraction aj of the budget for the production of good 0, then he provides the following




















7More peripherally related is Gautier and Soubeyran (2008). They analyze a dynamic model in which candidates have
diﬀerential abilities and in which public goods are somewhat durable, but in which candidates do not compete for the support
of a cutoﬀ voter (they are instead assumed to maximize the utility of the deterministic median voter in each period).
8Generally, we use superscripts to denote the candidate and subscripts to denote the good.
12has an advantage in the providing good 0, and Candidate 1 has an advantage in the providing good 1.
As shown in the left panel of Figure 1, the two candidates’ production possibility sets overlap, with
Candidate 0’s production possibility frontier being ﬂatter than that of Candidate 1.
Voters diﬀer in their utility functions, which depend on the amounts of public goods provided. The
utility function of a type t ∈ [0;1] voter is given by v(x0; x1;t), where t parameterizes voters’ preferences
for good 0 versus good 1, with low types putting more emphasis on good 0 and high types on good 1.
For example, utility functions of the form v(x0; x1;t) = (1 − t)v0(x0) + tv1(x1), where v0(·) and v1(·) are
the same concave functions for all voters, satisfy this property.9
The role of t is to parameterize the relative importance of the two goods. Voters with a low value of t
care primarily about the provision of good 0, and not so much about the provision of good 1. Conversely,
voters with a high value of of t care primarily about good 1. Graphically, the indiﬀerence curve of a high
t voter is ﬂatter than the indiﬀerence curve of a low t voter through the same point (x0; x1).
There is a continuum of voters,10 and the distribution of voter types in the population is uncertain.
Formally, nature draws a state ! that deﬁnes a distribution of voter types in state !. The median of the
voter types in state ! — which we denote by tm(!) — will be shown to be decisive for the election
outcome in that state. Recall that, if tm(!) is the median voter type, then 50% of the electorate in state !
is to the left and 50% to the right of tm(!). It is useful to denote the cumulative distribution function of
the median voter type tm(!) by F(·).
Includinguncertaintyabout the voterdistributionhas twoobjectives. First, it appears quiterealistic to
assume that the location of the median voter is not precisely known and that candidates have to make their
choices under some uncertainty. Second, if there is uncertainty over tm(!), then in our setup, maximizing
winning probability and maximizing vote share are typically identical objectives for candidates. Thus,
the assumption helps us to reﬁne the set of equilibria.11
The timing of the game is as follows: Candidates j = 0;1 simultaneously announce policies aj ∈
[0;1]. Each citizen votes for his preferred candidate, or abstains when indiﬀerent.12 The candidate who
receives more votes than his opponent wins the election. In case of a tie between the candidates, each
wins with probability 1=2. The winning candidate receives a payoﬀ of 1, while the loser gets 0 (i.e.,
candidates are oﬃce-motivated).
9In the appendix, we show that our qualitative results hold for a large class of preferences that satisfy a single-crossing
condition such that the marginal rate of substitution between goods 0 and 1 is decreasing in t.
10Nothing of importance would change if, instead, there are ﬁnitely many voters.
11If, instead, the distribution of voters was known with certainty, then (generically) one candidate wins for sure, and thus,
the policy choice of his opponent is indeterminate and the better candidate can also win with a whole set of policies. Therefore,
many strategies could be part of an equilibrium when candidates care only about the probability of winning. A natural focal
point of all these equilibria is the one in which both candidates maximize their vote share, and this again corresponds to the
equilibrium in our model.
12If a voter is indiﬀerent, he could in principle vote for any candidate or abstain. However, abstention is quite natural (e.g.,
in the presence of even very small voting costs).
13A ﬁnal word of interpretation is in order concerning the setup. While there are two public goods,
there is a ﬁxed budget constraint, and thus the policy variable aj is one-dimensional. In this regard, the
model exactly mirrors the standard one-dimensional spatial model that dominates most of the literature.
It is well-known that pure strategy equilibria generically fail to exist in a multidimensional version of the
spatial model, and the same reasons that lead to this result also apply in ours.
5 Results
Throughout this section, we concentrate on intuitive (often, graphical) arguments. Detailed formal proofs
are in the appendix.
5.1 Equilibrium
We argue ﬁrst that, in any equilibrium, Candidate 0 locates at a point that is to the right of the intersection
ˆ x of the two production possibility lines in the left panel of Figure 1, and Candidate 1 locates to the left
of that intersection point. It is easy to see that candidates cannot locate in equilibrium at points where
their opponent is strictly superior. For example, if Candidate 0 were instead to locate at x0 strictly to the
left of the intersection point, then Candidate 1 could just choose a point such as x1 in which Candidate 1
provides more of both public goods than Candidate 0, and consequently, all voters vote for Candidate 1
(remember that both candidates spend the same amount of money, so voter preferences are based only












of median type tm
Figure 1: Production possibility sets and non-equilibrium choices
Next, we show that in equilibrium the level of public goods provided cannot be at the intersection
point ˆ x.
14Denote by tm the voter type such that a candidate wins with probability 50%, if either all types t ≤ tm
or all types t ≥ tm vote for him. In analogy to the standard model, we call this type the “median”.13
Voter tm’s indiﬀerence curve is drawn in the right panel of Figure 1. As the graph indicates, Candidate 0
could instead move to x0, which is strictly preferred by type tm, thereby increasing Candidate 0’s win-
ning probability to more than 50%. Similarly, Candidate 1 could move to x1 and increase his winning
probability.14
We now know that, in a pure strategy equilibrium, the candidates’ public goods bundles are diﬀer-
entiated such that Candidate 0 provides more of good 0 than Candidate 1, and vice versa for good 1.
Consequently, voters whose type t is low (i.e., who care primarily about good 0) strictly prefer Candi-
date 0, and voters whose type t is high (i.e., who care primarily about good 1) strictly prefer Candidate 1.
There is some intermediate type ¯ t who is indiﬀerent between the candidates, and whom we call the cut-
oﬀ voter. The exact location of ¯ t of course depends on the platforms of both candidates, so that we
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Figure 2: Equilibrium choices
Consider ﬁrst the left panel in Figure 2 in which candidates oﬀer x0 and x1, respectively. The solid
indiﬀerence curve that runs through both of these bundles is that of the cutoﬀ voter type ¯ t(a0;a1). Voters
with types t < ¯ t have indiﬀerence curves that are steeper, and they strictly prefer x0 to x1 — in the graph,
such an indiﬀerence curve is indicated by the dashed curve through x0, where the arrow points is the
“better” direction. Consequently, voters with t < ¯ t(a0;a1) strictly prefer Candidate 0. Conversely, voters
with types t > ¯ t have indiﬀerence curves that are ﬂatter than ¯ t’s, and they strictly prefer x1 to x0 — the
dashed indiﬀerence curve through ¯ x1 represents one such voter. Consequently, all voters t > ¯ t(a0;a1)
13Formally, type tm is the “median median” in the following sense. Remember that tm(!) is the median type in state !. This
generates a distribution of median voters for diﬀerent states !, and tm is the median of this distribution.
14There are two nongeneric cases in which tm’s indiﬀerence curve is tangent to one of the production possibility lines. Even
in these cases, the other candidate can deviate and improve his winning probability, showing again that both candidates locating
at ˆ x is not an equilibrium.
15strictly prefer Candidate 1.
Note that Candidate 1’s choice in the left panel in Figure 2 does not maximize the utility of the
cutoﬀ voter. If Candidate 1 instead shifts his proposed bundle to ˜ x1, then the previous cutoﬀ voter and
even some voters who have slightly steeper indiﬀerence curves now prefer Candidate 1. Thus, the set of
voters who vote for Candidate 1 increases, and Candidate 1’s winning probability increases. It therefore
follows that (x0; x1) is not an equilibrium. In an equilibrium, neither candidate can further increase the
set of voters who support him. For this, it is necessary that the cutoﬀ voter’s indiﬀerence curve is tangent
to both production possibility frontiers, and that candidates locate at the respective points of tangency
(¯ x0; ¯ x1) as in the right panel of Figure 2.
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let (¯ a0; ¯ a1; ¯ t) denote the solution of the following equation system.
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= 0 (5)
If a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists, it is given by candidates choosing (¯ a0; ¯ a1), and all voters with
types t < ¯ t voting for Candidate 0, and all voters with types t > ¯ t voting for Candidate 1.
The equation system in Proposition 1 has a straightforward interpretation. Equation (3) speciﬁes that the
cutoﬀ type ¯ t is determined as the voter who is indiﬀerent between the candidates. Equations (4) and (5)
specify that the candidates choose their platforms to maximize the utility of voter type ¯ t. Of course, this
equation system corresponds to the fact that x0 and x1 are on the same indiﬀerence curve of the cutoﬀ
voter, and that they are both at points of tangency.
There is always a unique solution to the equation system (3)–(5), as we prove in Theorem 2 in the
Appendix. Intuitively, suppose that (¯ a0; ¯ a1; ¯ t) is a solution of (3)–(5), and suppose that there was a second
solution (˜ a0; ˜ a1; ˜ t) to the equation system (3)–(5), with ˜ t > ¯ t. We know that type ˜ t has indiﬀerence curves
that are everywhere ﬂatter than type ¯ t’s indiﬀerence curves. In the ﬁrst solution (¯ a0; ¯ a1; ¯ t), type ˜ t prefers
x1 to every bundle of public goods that Candidate 0 can oﬀer. A fortiori, this is true if Candidate 1 oﬀers
the optimal bundle for type ˜ t. Thus, if ˜ a1 satisﬁes (5), then (3) cannot hold. A similar argument shows
that ˜ t < ¯ t cannot hold either. Finally, for a given value of ¯ t, there are unique values of a0 and a1 that
satisfy (4) and (5).
It should be clear that the strategy proﬁle characterized in Proposition 1 is at least a local (strict)
equilibrium, in the sense that small deviations by a candidate would always decrease the set of voters
who vote for him, and therefore his winning probability. This is true because small deviations always
16decrease the utility of the cutoﬀ voter ¯ t, and therefore the deviating candidate loses the support of the
cutoﬀ voter and the set of voter types who support the deviating candidate is smaller than before. No
matter how the type distribution is, this decreases both the vote share and the winning probability of
the deviating candidate.15 This argument also shows that our modeling assumption that candidates are
uncertain about the distribution of voters’ preferences does not drive the result in Proposition 1 in any
signiﬁcant way — the same result would hold in a setting where candidates know the distribution of
voters and aim to maximize their vote share.
Now consider large deviations. We say that Candidate 0 outﬂanks Candidate 1 if he deviates to
oﬀer a bundle that oﬀers more of good 1 than the bundle proposed by Candidate 1; and analogously for
outﬂanking by Candidate 1. In other words, an outﬂanking candidate tries to appeal to those voters who
care most about goods for which his opponent has a production advantage.
We will present two types of conditions that guarantee existence of equilibrium. The ﬁrst one, de-
tailed in Theorem 1 in the Appendix, makes sure that candidates do not have a deviation available that
allows them to outﬂank their respective opponent. This type of condition depends only on properties of
the utility functions and the two candidates’ production possibility sets, but is independent of the speciﬁc
distribution of voter types.
The second type of existence condition applies in situations in which candidates can, in principle,
outﬂank their opponent. An outﬂanking move means that a candidate specializes extremely (i.e., more
strongly than his opponent does in equilibrium) on the public good in whose production he has a disad-
vantage. For this reason, the outﬂanking candidate is in a very precarious position that often makes this
an unattractive strategy (so that the original proﬁle is, in fact, an equilibrium).
Noteﬁrstthatanydeviationfrom(¯ a0; ¯ a1)thatisnotoutﬂankingcannotincreaseacandidate’swinning
probability. This follows from essentially the same arguments as above: Suppose, for example, that
Candidate 0 deviates to ˜ a0, but that this is not outﬂanking. Thus, both before and after the deviation, low
t types vote for Candidate 0, and the decisive issue is only how the deviation changes the cutoﬀ voter type
who is indiﬀerent between candidates. But the deviation away from ¯ a0 means that voter type ¯ t would
be worse oﬀ with Candidate 0 than before, and now strictly prefers Candidate 1. Consequently, the new
cutoﬀ voter must be to the left of ¯ t, and Candidate 0’s probability of winning decreases. In summary, any
deviation that is not outﬂanking decreases a candidate’s set of voters.
If candidates have suﬃciently diﬀerent expertise, then no candidate has any outﬂanking deviation.
Such a scenario is depicted in the left panel of Figure 3. Here, ¯ x0 is such that Candidate 1 cannot provide
more of good 0 than Candidate 0 does in equilibrium, even if he puts all resources in the production
15A decrease of the set of a candidate’s supporter voter types translates into a decrease of the candidate’s winning probability
if and only if the density of possible median voter types is positive at ¯ t. If F′(¯ t) = 0, i.e. the density of possible median voter
types is zero at ¯ t, then there are, in addition to the equilibrium we characterize, other equilibria (all of which have the same
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Figure 3: Large policy deviations
of good 0 (i.e., a1 = 1). Similarly, ¯ x1 is such that Candidate 0 cannot provide more of good 1 than
Candidate 1 does in equilibrium, even if he puts all resources in the production of good 1 (i.e., a0 = 0).
In this case, candidates cannot appeal successfully to their opponent’s core supporters. Graphically, it is
clear that this case is more likely to arise if the equilibrium platforms are far apart from each other, and
this in turn is more likely if the curvature of the cutoﬀ voter’s indiﬀerence curve is small. In Theorem 1
in the Appendix, we provide a formal condition that guarantees that equilibrium platforms are such that
no outﬂanking deviations are possible. Consequently, this provides a suﬃcient condition for the strategy
pair identiﬁed in Proposition 1 to be the equilibrium.
The right panel of Figure 3 depicts an outﬂanking deviation for Candidate 1. In the (¯ x0; ¯ x1) conﬁg-
uration, Candidate 1 attracts the votes of all types with indiﬀerence curves ﬂatter than those of type ¯ t
(i.e., types t > ¯ t). If Candidate 1 instead deviates to x′1, he will attract all types with indiﬀerence curves
steeper than those of type t′ (i.e., types t < t′).16
Let F(·) denote the cumulative distribution function of the median voter type tm(!). In the (¯ x0; ¯ x1)
conﬁguration, Candidate 1 attracts the votes of all types t > ¯ t, so that his winning probability is 1 − F(¯ t),
while Candidate 0 wins with probability F(¯ t). If Candidate 1 plays his optimal outﬂanking deviation,
Candidate 1 attracts the votes of all types t < t′, so that his winning probability is F(t′). Since t′ < ¯ t,
F(t′) < F(¯ t). Thus, Candidate 1’s winning probability with his optimal outﬂanking deviation is strictly
less than his opponent’s winning probability in the (¯ x0; ¯ x1) conﬁguration. An analogous argument holds
for Candidate 0. Thus, a suﬃcient condition for (¯ a0; ¯ a1; ¯ t) to be an equilibrium is that both candidate’s
winning probabilities are close to 1=2. This is stated formally in the following proposition.
16Note that x′1 is Candidate 1’s optimal outﬂanking deviation, as the indiﬀerence curve of type t′ is tangent to his production
possibility frontier. Candidate 1 cannot appeal to types with ﬂatter indiﬀerence curves (as their indiﬀerence curve through ¯ x0
never touches his production possibility frontier.
18Proposition 2 Let (¯ a0; ¯ a1; ¯ t) denote the strategy conﬁguration characterized in Proposition 1.
1. A deviation is always strictly detrimental for a candidate whose winning probability is at least 1=2.
2. There exists " > 0 such that, if F(¯ t) ∈ (0:5 − ";0:5 + "), a deviation is always strictly detrimental
for both candidates.
5.2 Welfare
We now turn to the welfare properties of the equilibrium. There is a general intuitive notion that
policy convergence such as the one arising in the one-dimensional standard model is excessive over-
convergence, eﬀectively depriving voters of a real choice. This notion of essentially equivalent candi-
dates is not true in the equilibrium of our model, where almost all voters have a strict preference for one
of the two candidates. Nevertheless, from a social point of view, the candidates converge too much in
equilibrium. If a social planner could force both candidates to put more emphasis on the policy area in
which they are strong, then (with probability 1), a majority of the population would be better oﬀ.
Intuitively, the reason why a majority of the population would be better oﬀ if the candidates focused
marginally more on their strong issue is the following. In equilibrium, both candidates choose, from their
respective sets of available policies, the one that maximizes the utility of the cutoﬀ voter ¯ t. If Candidate 0
wins, this means that a majority of voters cares relatively more about good 0 provision than the cutoﬀ
voter. The preferred budget share allocated to good 0 production for each member of this majority is
larger than what is optimal for the cutoﬀ voter. An analogous argument shows that, if Candidate 1 wins
the election, a majority of voters would be better oﬀ with a lower a1 (i.e., with a stronger focus on
Candidate 1’s strength in good 1 production).
Proposition 3 Suppose that (a0;a1) is an equilibrium in which both candidates have a strictly positive
probability of winning, and that tm(!) has a strictly positive density. Then the following is true with
probability 1.17
1. If Candidate 0 wins, then there exists a0′ > a0 such that, ex-post, a majority of voters would strictly
prefer a0′ to a0.
2. If Candidate 1 wins, then there exists a1′ < a1 such that, ex-post, a majority of voters would strictly
prefer a1′ to a1.
17The reason why the statements in the proposition are only true “with probability 1” (rather than “always”) is that, in
principle, it is possible that the cutoﬀ voter ¯ t is also the realized median voter. In this case, a marginal changes of policy would
make a (bare) majority worse oﬀ. However, note that tm(!) = ¯ t occurs only with probability 0.
19To better understand the reasons for the ineﬃciency, it is useful to refer to the deﬁnitions of ex-
ante majority-eﬃciency and competition-eﬃciency in Krasa and Polborn (2006).18 Ex-ante majority-
eﬃciency compares the voters’ utilities when the candidate is elected and implements his equilibrium
platform a with the voters’ utilities if he instead implements some alternative platform a′. Whether a
majority of the electorate is better or worse oﬀ with a or a′ depends on the state ! that determines the
voter preference distribution. A candidate’s platform a is ex-ante majority-eﬃcient if there is no other
platform a′ that is more likely to make a majority of the electorate better oﬀ than worse oﬀ.
In contrast, competition-eﬃciency refers to the equilibrium pair of platforms, (a0;a1) in comparison
to some other pair of platforms (˜ a0; ˜ a1). Given the platforms, the state of the world ! determines which
candidate wins and which policy is implemented, and thus ultimately whether a majority of voters would
prefer what they receive under (a0;a1) or under (˜ a0; ˜ a1). The equilibrium (a0;a1) is called competition-
eﬃcient if a majority of the electorate is more likely to be better oﬀ under (a0;a1) than under (˜ a0; ˜ a1), for
any other pair of platforms (˜ a0; ˜ a1).
In our model, the candidates’ equilibrium strategies are generally not ex-ante majority-eﬃcient, be-
cause the cutoﬀ voter is usually diﬀerent from the “median median voter” (i.e., the median realization
over ! of the median voter). In the equilibrium of our model, there may be a very high probability that
the median voter, and thus a majority of the electorate, would prefer (say) a higher emphasis on spending
on good 0 than both candidates choose to provide in equilibrium. Yet, candidates would suﬀer a reduc-
tion in their winning probability if they catered more to the (likely) majority interests. We demonstrate
this possibility by example in Section 5.4 below.
The fact that equilibrium strategies are not ex-ante majority-eﬃcient also implies that the equilibrium
isnotcompetition-eﬃcient. However, competition-ineﬃciencycanalsoariseduetoasecondchannel. To
understandthis eﬀectinour model, consider the specialcase inwhich thecutoﬀvoterhappens tobe equal
to the median median voter. In this case, each candidate’s platform is ex-ante majority-eﬃcient, because
it is more likely that a majority of the electorate prefers the equilibrium platform to any other platform
with higher or lower spending on good 0. However, the equilibrium pair of platforms (a0;a1) is still not
competition-eﬃcient, because both candidates maximize the utility of the same type ¯ t. Uncertainty about
the distribution of voter preferences implies that the realized median voter is almost never identical to ¯ t.
Speciﬁcally, let (˜ a0; ˜ a1) = (a0 + ";a1 − ") (with " > 0 but suﬃciently small, i.e., both candidates
choose a platform that is a bit more “extreme” than their equilibrium platform in the sense that it is
preferred by most of their supporters to their respective equilibrium platform, while all voters who prefer
their respective opponent are worse oﬀ with the new platform in comparison to the equilibrium platform.
Under the pair of platforms (˜ a0; ˜ a1), Candidate 0 wins if and only if low types are in the majority, i.e.
if tm(!) < ¯ t, and in these cases, the majority prefers the stronger emphasis on good 0 production in ˜ a0
18This working paper version of Krasa and Polborn (2009c) contains more general results than the published version, in
particular an analysis of the case with uncertainty about voter preferences which is relevant here.
20relative to a0. Conversely, Candidate 1 wins if and only if high types are in the majority, i.e. if tm(!) > ¯ t,
and in these cases, the majority prefers the stronger emphasis on good 1 production in ˜ a1 relative to a1.
The importance of this second eﬀect depends on the degree of uncertainty about the median voter’s
position. For example, if candidates have access to precise opinion polls, this eﬀect should be negligible.
Incontrast, thesizeoftheﬁrsteﬀect(duetothediﬀerencebetweenmedianandcutoﬀvoter)iscompletely
independent of the speciﬁc uncertainty in the voter distribution.
The result that candidates’ platforms are “too moderate” with probability 1 diﬀerentiates our model
from most standard one-dimensional models with policy divergence. Consider, for example, the citizen-
candidate model of Osborne and Slivinski (1996). In their model, there exists (for large parameter sets)
an equilibrium in which two candidates located symmetrically at opposite sides of the median voter run
against each other, and each wins with probability 1=2. Independent of whether the right-wing or left-
wing candidate wins the election, a majority of voters would like the winning candidate to implement
a more moderate policy (i.e., a policy that is closer to the median). The same result applies in models
where policy divergence is due to entry deterrence (Palfrey (1984), Callander (2005)). Likewise, in
Calvert’s (1985) model in which two policy-motivated candidates are uncertain about the median voter’s
preferred position and choose platforms to maximize their own expected utility from the implemented
policy, divergence arises because each candidate chooses his position trading-oﬀ an increased probability
of winning from moderating his platform, and a lower utility from the more moderate policy. If the
election outcome is suﬃciently close, then the realized median voter’s preferred position is between the
two candidates’ positions, and consequently, a majority of the electorate would strictly prefer that the
election winner adopts a more moderate position than promised during the campaign.19
Bernhardt, Duggan, and Squintani (2009), who analyze a standard model with uncertainty about the
position of the median also ﬁnd that voters may beneﬁt in expectation from platform divergence that
results when parties are policy-motivated instead of oﬃce-motivated.20 Note, though, that the extent
of the ineﬃciency in their model is limited if uncertainty about the location of the median is small. In
contrast, the size of the ineﬃciency in our model remains generally bounded away from 0 even if the
uncertainty about the position of the median goes to zero.
5.3 Comparative statics
We now consider what happens to the equilibrium policies when one of the candidates becomes more
productive. Suppose, for concreteness, that Candidate 0 becomes more eﬃcient in the production of
19If the election result is lopsided in the Calvert (1985) model, then the realized median voter’s preferred position may be
more extreme than the platform proposed by the winning candidate, so that a majority would prefer the implementation of a
more extreme platform. However, this situation certainly does not arise with probability 1, as in our model.
20More generally, Krasa and Polborn (2006), Theorems 5 and 6 show that, in a class of models containing the standard
model, the candidates’ equilibrium platforms are competition-eﬃcient if and only if there is no uncertainty about the preferred
position of the median voter.
21good i. It is clear that this change increases the electoral support for Candidate 0, i.e. the cutoﬀ voter
moves to the right (¯ t increases). Candidate 1’s productivity did not change, but we know that he chooses
his equilibrium policy with the objective of appealing to the new cutoﬀ voter, who is more interested in
good 1 relative to good 0 than the previous cutoﬀ voter. Consequently, Candidate 1 lowers a1 in order to
increase his production of good 1. More generally, the candidate whose productivity did not increase is
forced to focus more strongly on the production of the good in which he has an advantage.
For Candidate 0, there are two eﬀects that possibly go in diﬀerent directions. First, the same indirect
“competition” eﬀect discussed in the previous paragraph implies that, in order to appeal to the new cutoﬀ
voter, Candidate 0 has an incentive to increase his production of good 1. The direct “substitution” eﬀect,
in contrast, depends on which of the two production functions became more productive. If Candidate 0’s
productivity in good i production increased, then every voter type prefers a higher level of good i pro-
duction than before. Thus, if Candidate 0’s productivity in producing good 1 increased, then both the
indirect and the direct eﬀect go in the same direction, and Candidate 0 will choose a lower value of a0
(i.e., more good 1 production) than before. In contrast, if Candidate 0’s productivity in producing good 0
increased, then the indirect and the direct eﬀect go in opposite directions, and the sign of the total eﬀect
is, in general, unclear.
Proposition 4 1. Any increase of Candidate 0’s productivity induces Candidate 1 to increase his
good 1 provision (and, correspondingly, to decrease his good 0 provision): da1
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3. An improvement of Candidate 0’s productivity in good 0 production may induce Candidate 0 to
provide more or less of good 0.
Groseclose (2001) provides an inﬂuential theoretical model with policy-motivated candidates and
diﬀerential additive valence and uncertainty about the median voter’s position. Without valence diﬀer-
ences, the two candidates locate symmetrically around the expected median. When the valence of one
of the candidates increases, his equilibrium position initially becomes more moderate before eventually
(i.e., forsuﬃcientlyhighvalenceadvantage)becomingmoreextreme. Incontrast, thedisadvantagedcan-
didate always becomes more extreme as his opponent’s valence increases. Thus, his model provides an
explanation for the contradictory results in empirical studies of the “marginality hypothesis” that posits
that weaker candidates “moderate” their policy position in order to increase their reelection probability.
Proposition 4 shows that our model provides an alternative theory for somewhat similar results,
though based on diﬀerent fundamental reasons than in Groseclose (2001), where divergence arises based
on policy motivation. In our model the weaker candidate becomes more extreme (i.e., focuses more
strongly on his strong good), while the eﬀects for the candidate whose productivity increases are more
subtle, as competition eﬀect and substitution eﬀect may go in opposite directions.
22Another exogenous change that one can analyze is what happens when the budget increases. In
classical microeconomic household theory, a household with a homogeneous utility function always
spends the same fraction of his income on each good, no matter how rich he is. The CES-utility function
in our canonical example is homogeneous and, consequently, an exogenous increase of the budget would
leave the budget fraction allocated to each good that is optimal for the cutoﬀ voter unaﬀected. It is also
easy to check that the type of the indiﬀerent voter does not change when candidates leave their budget
allocation unchanged. Thus, for homogeneous voter utility functions, a change in the government’s
budget does not change the equilibrium budget allocations for the two public goods (relative to the total
size of the budget). This would change for non-homogeneous voter utility functions, as in this case,
an increase of the budget may aﬀect the cutoﬀ voter type, with corresponding changes in equilibrium
platforms.
5.4 Application: Voter preferences with constant elasticity of substitution
In this section, we determine the equilibrium solution of the model for the case of utility functions with










where  ∈ (−∞;1]. Our main interest in this section is how properties of the voters’ utility functions (in
particular, the degree of substitutability between the public goods) inﬂuence whether candidates use the
proposed budget allocation to strengthen their strong issue, or to partially compensate for their weakness.
Tounderstandthe roleof, observethat themarginalrate ofsubstitution (theslope oftheindiﬀerence

































In the CES utility function given in (6), 1
1− is referred to as elasticity of substitution and measures the
curvature of the voter’s indiﬀerence curve. If  = 1, then voters are only interested in a weighted sum of
x0 and x1; the weights t and 1−t diﬀer between voters, but the slope of each voter’s indiﬀerence curve is
constant at −
(1−t)
t (as (x1=x0)0 = 1 for all x0 and x1). The constant marginal rate of substitution implies,
for example, for voter type t = 2=3, an increase of x1 by one unit is always worth as much as an increase
of x0 by two units. In contrast, for  < 1, the voters’ marginal rate of substitution depends on x0 and x1
(as well as, of course, on t). For example, the case of  → 0 corresponds to Cobb-Douglas preferences,
and  → −∞ corresponds to L-shaped “Leontief” indiﬀerence curves.21





is very large if x1 > x0, and is close to zero if x1 < x0.
23Given policy proposals a0 and a1, the voter who is indiﬀerent between the two candidates is given by





















1(1 − a1)) + (0
1(1 − a0)): (9)
Candidate 0’s objective is to increase t(a0;a1) as far as possible, because each voter t ≤ t(a0;a1) votes
for Candidate 0. Similarly, Candidate 1’s objective is to decrease t(a0;a1) as far as possible, because
each voter t ≥ t(a0;a1) votes for Candidate 1. As we show in the Appendix, the corresponding ﬁrst-order























1). Thus, if  ∈ (0;1], the
left-hand side of (10) is smaller than 1, which implies a0 > a1. Conversely, if  < 0, the left-hand side
of (10) is greater than 1, which implies a0 < a1, and  = 0 is the boundary case where a0 = a1.22
Proposition 5 For the class of CES-utility functions given by (6), the following results hold.
1. If  ∈ (0;1], then a0 > a1;
2. If  = 0, then a0 = a1;
3. If  < 0, then a0 < a1;
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, in cases where the two public goods are relatively good substitutes, candidates choose plat-
formsthat further strengthen theirrespectivestrong point; that is, Candidate 0 choosesto put more money
into the production of good 0 than Candidate 1, and vice versa for good 1. In contrast, in cases where the
two public goods are relatively poor substitutes, candidates choose platforms in which they compensate
for their weakness; that is, each candidate puts less money than his opponent into the production of the
good in which he is strong; this allows the candidate to spend more money on his weak good, partially
oﬀsetting the advantage of his competitor there.
22The CES utility function is not deﬁned for  = 0, but it is well known that the logarithmic utility function (equivalent to a
Cobb-Douglas utility function here) is a utility function with constant elasticity of substitution equal to 1 (= 1 − ).
24In order to analyze existence conditions for the equilibrium, it is useful to assume a symmetric ability
distribution such that 0
0 = 1
1 = r and 0
1 = 1
0 = 1−r, where r ≥ 0:5 measures the extent of (symmetric)
specialization. If r is close to 1=2, a candidate’s advantage in his better ﬁeld is very limited, while if r is
high, each candidate is a specialist in his strong ﬁeld and a rookie in the other ﬁeld.
We know from Proposition 1 that candidates choose positions that maximize the utility of the cutoﬀ
voter. Maximizing [
(1 − t)(ra0) + t((1 − r)(1 − a0))]1=
(11)
with respect to a0 for Candidate 0, and an analogous problem for Candidate 1, and substituting ¯ t = 1=2






















The corresponding production levels are
¯ x0

























Suppose (without loss of generality) that F(0:5) ≥ 0:5. Since Candidate 0 wins with probability F(0:5)
if both candidates play according to (12), we know from Proposition 2 that Candidate 0 has no incentive
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(b) C1 attracts low types
Figure 4: Cutoﬀ as function of Candidate 1’s choice of a1 (r = 0:55; = 0:5)
Figure 4 provides the cutoﬀ individual as a function of Candidate 1’s budget allocation a1, for  = 0:5
and r = 0:55 (i.e., very moderate specialization of candidates). If a1 < 0:6318, then Candidate 1 attracts
25all voters located above the cutoﬀ in the left panel. Consequently, Candidate 1’s set of supporters is
maximized (in this range) for a1 = 0:45, for which the cutoﬀ is 0:5. This, of course, is just ¯ a1 given in
(12). Allocating slightly more money to good 0 production just loses moderate voters (i.e., the cutoﬀ
goes up). For a1 ∈ [0:6318;0:6722],23 all voters prefer Candidate 0. The outﬂanking deviations start
from a1 > 0:6722. Candidate 1 now appeals to voter types below the cutoﬀ, i.e., those voters who
care primarily about good 0. Thus, it is optimal for him to maximize the cutoﬀ in this range. This is
achievedbysettinga1 ≈ 0:8195, whichgeneratesacutoﬀofslightlylessthan0:298, sothatCandidate1’s
winning probability with the optimal deviation is about F(0:298). Thus, if 1− F(0:5) > F(0:298) (i.e., if
the probability that the median voter is a type larger than 0.5 is larger than the probability that the median
voter type is below 0.298), then even the optimal deviation decreases Candidate 1’s winning probability.
For example, suppose that the location of the median voter is normally distributed around 0.4 with
standard deviation t. For any t, the actions characterized by (12) are the unique equilibrium, because
1 − F(0:5) > F(0:298). From a welfare perspective, the equilibrium in which candidates maximize the
utility of voter type 0.5 appears very ineﬃcient: As t → 0, the median voter is almost certainly close
to 0.4 and Candidate 0 wins the election with probability close to 1 (as he has a comparative advantage
in the production of the good that the majority cares about more). However, he does so with a platform
that, from a social point of view, caters too much to the interests of the (likely) minority that cares more
about good 1.
6 Extensions
In this section, we analyze the robustness of the model with respect to three important assumptions of the
basic model. First, candidates are exogenously assumed in the basic model to have diﬀerential productiv-
ities. Here, we want to analyze a setup in which, instead, parties choose their respective candidates from
a set that contains both balanced and specialized potential candidates. Second, we assume in the basic
model that the candidate’s tax rate is exogenously ﬁxed at the same level for both candidates; here, we
analyze what would happen when candidates can choose the tax rate as part of their platform (in addition
to the budget allocation). Third, we present an important re-interpretation of the model.
6.1 Party choice of candidates
A key ingredient of our model is that candidates have diﬀerentiated abilities. Since the equilibrium is
much diﬀerent when both candidates instead have the same abilities, it is crucial to analyze the incentives
of the parties whom to nominate when there is a choice between several diﬀerent potential candidates.
In particular, we are interested in a setup in which the parties’ choice sets overlap, so that they could, in
23The exact boundaries of this interval are 139=220 and 121=180.
26principle, nominate two candidates who have exactly the same capabilities. It is then meaningful to ask
whether parties select candidates that coincide or diﬀer from the opponent chosen by the other party.
The choice behavior of parties depends on their objectives. A party can be either oﬃce-motivated or
policy-motivated. Whilewebelievethattherearegoodargumentsthatpartiesrepresentingtheirmembers
are more policy-motivated than candidates, we initially focus on oﬃce-motivated parties, because (i) this
isthehardercasefordivergence24 and(ii), itallowsustoshowclearlythediﬀerencebetweenthestandard
model and our model.
Asabenchmarkcase, considerthefollowingnominationmodelinastandardone-dimensionalDown-
sian framework with oﬃce motivated parties: Suppose that voters ideal points are distributed in [0;1]
and that the median median is located at 0.5 — recall that receiving the support of the median-median
implies that the winning probability is at least 50%. Suppose furthermore that the liberal party can select
a candidate L ∈ [0;0:5], while the conservative party can select a candidate R ∈ [0:5;1].25 Candidates
are citizen-candidates in the sense that they cannot credibly commit during the election campaign to
another policy than their most preferred one.
If the parties only care about winning, then it is optimal for them to choose identical candidates, i.e.,
L = R = 0:5. Diﬀerentiated candidates will only be chosen if parties care about policy. Suppose the
typical liberal party member prefers a policy strictly to the left of 0:5 and the conservative party a policy
to the right of 0.5, then L < R. However, parties are now trading oﬀ getting their party into oﬃce against
getting their most preferred policy implemented. In other words, in the standard framework, satisfying
the policy objectives of a party’s rank and ﬁle members and maximizing the winning probability of the
party’s candidate are conﬂicting objectives.
Indeed, it would be problematic if a similar intuition applied in our model, because it would suggest
that parties select candidates that are very similar, unless they have a very substantial policy motivation.
However, we now show that, in contrast to the standard framework, parties have a strong incentive to
chose diﬀerentially skilled candidates in our model.
We choose a setup that is completely symmetric to the one we just discussed for the Downsian
model. We assume that party 0 is composed of individuals more keen on good 0 than the median median
(i.e., t < tm for party 0 supporters), while party 1 consists of individuals that care more about good 1
(t > tm). Each party must choose between a “balanced candidate” and another candidate, who is better
in providing the good party members like, but worse in producing the other good. After candidates are
nominated, they choose which combination of goods to propose from their budget set.
Suppose ﬁrst that parties choose balanced candidates. The equilibrium in the following subgame is
depicted in the top left panel of Figure 5. Both candidates’ production possibility frontiers coincide, and
they choose the same policy am that results in provision of xm of public goods that maximize the median
24It is well known that policy-motivation leads to divergence in the standard model, and the same would be true here as well
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Figure 5: Endogenous Diﬀerentiation
voter’s utility. Each candidate wins with 50% probability.
Now suppose that party 0 nominates instead a candidate who is better in producing good 0 and
worse in producing good 1. Assume, for the moment, that this candidate could still provide xm. The
resulting equilibrium is shown in the right top panel of ﬁgure 5. Note that ¯ x0, the equilibrium public
good allocation by Candidate 0, is strictly preferred by the median type to ¯ x1 (Candidate 1’s equilibrium
response), so that Candidate 0’s winning probability is now strictly larger than 50% because tm and even
some types t > tm now support Candidate 0. Thus, even a purely oﬃce-motivated party prefers the
specialized candidate. Note, though, that another beneﬁcial aspect of diﬀerentiation from the perspective
of party members is that they all prefer ¯ x0 to xm: Party members identify more with the platform that is
proposed by a specialized candidate. The lower left panel of Figure 5 shows that a symmetric argument
applies to party 1.
Note that the new candidate’s production possibility frontier does not have to go through xm in order
for the above eﬀect to work. Consider, for example, the lower right panel of Figure 5. Given the solid
production possibility frontier of Candidate 1, ¯ x1 is optimal, and the median voter is indiﬀerent between
28the two candidates, and each of them wins with 50% probability. If the production possibility set is
moved to the right (e.g., the dashed line), then Candidate 1’s winning probability is strictly larger than
50%, even though he may not be able to provide xm.
In summary, the forces that determine the optimal candidate choice by parties in our model diﬀer
signiﬁcantly from those present in the standard framework. In the standard model, choosing a “more
extreme” candidate may please party members (if they are policy motivated), but the probability that
the party’s nominee wins the election suﬀers. In contrast, choosing a more specialized candidate (who
is better at producing the party’s preferred good even at the expense of being worse in producing the
other good) has the potential of both pleasing party members and increasing the winning probability
of the party’s candidate. Thus, the forces that induce parties to choose diﬀerentiated candidates in our
model appear stronger than those that lead to policy diﬀerentiation in the standard framework, and so
the assumption that candidates are, in fact, diﬀerentiated with respect to their productivities in diﬀerent
policy ﬁelds appear quite robust.
6.2 Endogenous taxation
In the basic model, we assume that both candidates raise the same taxes and thus face the same budget
constraint. In this section, we consider what happens when the level of taxation is another choice variable
for candidates.
A voter’s type is now determined by the voter’s income m in addition to the preference parameter t.
If the tax rate is , then private consumption is c = (1 − )m. The voter’s utility is given by
ln(c) + v(x0; x1;t); (14)
where v is homogeneous of degree k > 0 in (x0; x1),26 which, for example, is the case for CES prefer-
ences. For simplicity, suppose that there is no uncertainty about the average income, which we denote
by ¯ m. Candidates choose a platform consisting of a tax rate and a budget allocation, (j;aj).
We now show that the equilibrium budget allocations of the basic model, ¯ aj, j = 0;1, remain an
equilibrium allocation in the extended model with taxes. Voter (t;m) is indiﬀerent between the two
candidates if
ln((1 − 0)m) + v(x0
0; x0
1;t) = ln((1 − 1)m) + v(x1
0; x1
1;t): (15)
Since ln((1 − j)m) = ln(1 − j) + ln(m) it follows that t is independent of m. Hence there exists a cutoﬀ
voter ¯ t as in the basic model, and in equilibrium each candidate must maximize ¯ t’s utility.





















1(1 − aj)j ¯ m;t
)
;
26That is, v(x0;x1;t) = kv(x0; x1;t).












1(1 − aj)¯ m;t
)
; (16)
Let ¯ aj, j = 0;1 be the equilibrium budget allocation of the basic model and let ¯ t be the corresponding
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1; ¯ t) = 0: (17)
In the basic model voter ¯ t is indiﬀerent between the candidates’ proposals, i.e., v(x0
0; x0
1; ¯ t) = v(x1
0; x1
1; ¯ t).
Hence (17) implies that both candidates propose the same tax rate, i.e., ¯ 0 = ¯ 1. Thus, ¯ j, ¯ aj, is an
equilibrium of the extended model. Any deviation by Candidate j would lower voter ¯ t’s utility from j’s
policy. Voter ¯ t would therefore strictly prefer the opposing candidate, and the set of voters supporting
Candidate j would be strictly smaller. Thus, it is not optimal for candidate j to deviate from (¯ j; ¯ aj).
If the distribution of the media voter tm(!) has a strictly positive density around ¯ t, then (¯ j; ¯ aj),
j = 0;1 is in fact the unique Nash equilibrium (mixed or pure). To see this, suppose there exists another
pure strategy equilibrium (ˆ j; ˆ aj), j = 0;1. Denote the cutoﬀ voter by ˆ t. Then ˆ t , ¯ t, else the above
argument implies that the equilibrium must be be the same, i.e., (¯ j; ¯ aj) = (ˆ j; ˆ aj). Suppose that ˆ t < ¯ t
(the argument for ˆ t > ¯ t is analogous). Then Candidate 0 gets the support of all voters t < ˆ t, while in
the original equilibrium also types t with ˆ t ≤ t < ¯ t support him. If Candidate 0 chooses (¯ 0; ¯ a0) then he
maximizes voter ¯ t’s utility. In the original equilibrium both candidates maximized ¯ t’s utility and ¯ t was
indiﬀerent between them. Thus, the deviation ensures that Candidate 0 receives the support of at least all
voters t < ¯ t, and of ¯ t and some voters t > ¯ t if (ˆ 1; ˆ a1) , (¯ 1; ¯ a1). As the median voter lies between ˆ t and ¯ t
with strictly positive probability, Candidate 0’s deviation strictly increases the winning probability. Thus,
(ˆ j; ˆ aj), j = 0;1 cannot be an equilibrium. The argument can be extended along the lines of Theorem 2
in the Appendix to show that there is no equilibrium in mixed strategies, and hence (¯ j; ¯ aj), j = 0;1 is
the unique Nash equilibrium.
It is somewhat surprising that tax rates are identical even if the candidates’ productivities are asym-




1 = 11. In this case, Candidate 0
seems to be “on average more productive” than his opponent: Both candidates have a productivity of
10 in their worse good, but Candidate 0 has a productivity of 12 in his better good, which is better than
Candidate 1’s productivity in his better good. Thus, it would seem at ﬁrst glance that Candidate 0 should
propose a higher tax rate in order to capitalize on his higher average productivity. Yet, this is not true in
equilibrium.
Voter t = 1=2 cares equally about both goods. Hence if both candidates maximizes the utility of t =
1=2 then Candidate 0 would take advantage of being more productive by increasing production of public
30goods, and he would ﬁnance this spending by charging higher taxes than his opponent, Candidate 0.
However, t = 1=2 is not the cutoﬀ voter, as t = 1=2 is strictly better oﬀ with Candidate 0. Instead, the
cutoﬀ voter’s type is ¯ t > 1=2 and cares more for good 1 than for good 0. Thus, Candidate 0’s production
advantage is not as important for ¯ t as for type t = 1=2. At the same time, Candidate 1 is better at
providing at good 1. At ¯ t, the relative advantages of both candidates balance each other exactly such
that the beneﬁt (or costs) of increasing taxes are identical for both candidates. As a consequence, both
candidates propose the same tax rate.
6.3 Uncertainty and disagreement about the production process of public goods
Finally, it is useful to point out that our model can be re-interpreted as one in which only one ultimate
public good is provided, and all voters just want the highest quantity possible. However, there is dis-
agreement among voters how the ultimate public good is provided from two intermediate goods.
Consider the following example. The ultimate public good that all voters care about is “national
security.” The two main inputs that aﬀect the level of national security are “international goodwill”
and “military power.” International goodwill reduces the likelihood that other actors such as foreign
states or ethnic or religious communities want to undertake aggressive actions that are detrimental to the
interests of our country. Military power works both as a deterrent and increases our ability to deal with an
aggressive move, should one occur. Both “international goodwill” and “military power” can be increased
by spending money on, say, development aid or military hardware, respectively. However, it is also quite
plausible that the identity of the winning candidate matters. For example, in the last presidential election
Obama was generally thought to be able to provide more “international goodwill” than McCain. It is
also plausible that, because of his military background, a majority of voters believed that McCain had a
competence advantage in increasing “military power”.
This model is analytically equivalent to the two-goods setup that we analyze. In our formal model,
citizens directly derive utility from two public goods, and a parameter measures how much they care
about each good. A key role for the analysis is played by the voters’ indiﬀerence curves, i.e., all those
combinations of the public goods that lead to the same utility for a voter. In the intermediate goods
scenario, voters diﬀer in how eﬀective they believe that certain intermediate goods are at producing the
ultimate good; thus, each voter’s indiﬀerence curves in this scenario are eﬀectively the “isoquants” of
the production process in which the voter believes.
During the campaign, candidates can make policy proposals that imply how much they would invest
in the two intermediate goods. Voters who believe that military power matters most for national security
will prefer the candidate whose platform oﬀers more of it, and vice versa for those who believe that
international goodwill is more important. Conversely, candidates have an incentive to oﬀer a platform
that emphasizes their strength (with respect to the intermediate good that they are better at producing).
31We should note that game theorists sometimes ﬁnd it problematic to assume that agents diﬀer in their
beliefs about how the world works (the “common prior assumption” in game theory). Yet, in practice, the
phenomenon that actors genuinely disagree about complex causation mechanisms appears to be wide-
spread. Since the national security outcome is a very complex and longterm process, we would argue that
it is quite plausible that voters have substantial and stable diﬀerences of opinion about how international
goodwill and military power interact in generating national security: Even though they may genuinely
be interested in the same ultimate outcome, some voters may believe that what matters is primarily hard
military power, while others may believe that international goodwill matters substantially, too.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a formal model of political competition between candidates with hetero-
geneous capabilities in diﬀerent policy ﬁelds. Candidates are oﬃce-motivated and compete by proposing
how to allocate government resources to diﬀerent policy ﬁelds. The model has a unique equilibrium that
diﬀers substantially from the standard one-dimensional model. While candidates compete for the support
of a moderate voter type, this cutoﬀ voter diﬀers from the expected median voter. Moreover, no voter
type except the cutoﬀ voter is indiﬀerent between the candidates in equilibrium. The model predicts that
candidates respond to changes in the preferences of voters in a very rigid way. We also analyze under
which conditions candidates choose to strengthen the issues in which they have a competence advantage,
and when they rather compensate for their weaknesses.
Finally, we show that when parties can choose the qualities of their nominee, they have an incentive
to go for a candidate who is a specialist in the production of the good that party members care about
more, rather than a balanced generalist. This is because parties know that their candidate will eventually
choose his platform to appeal to a moderate cutoﬀ voter, but the more specialized he is in the production
of the good that party members care about most, the more he will provide of that good in equilibrium.
Our model opens up several avenues for future research. We have already discussed in Section 2
how our model can inform empirical studies. One interesting theoretical issue is the nature of political
campaigning in our framework. In a standard Downsian model, trying to inﬂuence the distribution of
voter ideal points has no beneﬁt for a candidate who is interested only in winning, because candidates
converge on the same platform anyway. In contrast, since candidates in the diﬀerential skills model have
no opportunity to gain votes through pandering to marginal supporters of their opponent, an attractive
option for a campaign may be to persuade voters that the issue in which the candidate has an advantage
is “really important” (in the sense of trying to inﬂuence the t in voters’ utility functions). In this respect,
it may be useful to combine our framework with the campaign model of Hammond and Humes (1993).27
27Hammond and Humes (1993) study issue-framing by candidates in a two-dimensional Euclidean model. In their model,
voters are initially uninformed about candidates’ (exogenous) positions, and candidates can only make their position in one
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Theorem 1 Suppose that utility v(x;t) is continuous in t and x, strictly monotone, and strictly quasicon-
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Assume that candidate j has a relative advantage in providing good j, i.e., 
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j for i , j. Let  be a
lower bound for the elasticity of substitution for all consumption bundles (x0; x1) and all types t. Suppose
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  : (19)
Then there exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium with the following properties:
1. There exists a voter type ¯ t who is indiﬀerent between candidates 0 and 1; all types t < ¯ t strictly
prefer Candidate 0 and all types t > ¯ t strictly prefer Candidate 1.
2. Both candidates’ equilibrium strategies maximize the utility of voter ¯ t.
3. The equilibrium strategies are independent of the distribution  of voter types.
4. Candidate 0 provides strictly more of public good 0 than Candidate 1, while Candidate 1 provides
strictly more of public good 1 than Candidate 0.
The following Lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 1 Let x0, x1 be the amount of public goods oﬀered by the two candidates. Let D = {t|v(xj;t) ≥
v(x−j;t)} be the set of types t that weakly prefer xj to x−j. Then D is an interval. Moreover, if D , [0;1],
then v(xj;t) = v(x−j;t) only for the endpoint of the interval D that is strictly inside [0;1].
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose by way of contradiction that D is not an interval for some xj; x−j.
Note that we must have xj , x−j, else D = [0;1]. Then there exist t < t′ < t′′ such that t;t′′ ∈ D
but t′ < D. Continuity of utility in t implies that there exists t0 < t1 such that v(xj;t0) = v(x−j;t0)
and v(xj;t1) = v(x−j;t1). Thus, the indiﬀerence curves of voters t0 and t1 intersect twice, which is a
contradiction to (18). Hence, D is an interval.
dimension known to voters, and they can choose which one they want to broadcast (that is, they can choose to frame “what the
election is about”).
28See Mirrlees (1971) and Spence (1974). For a use of the single-crossing property in the standard Downsian model, see
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Figure 6: Illustration of the proof of claim 1 in Theorem 1
Moreover, if D , [0;1], the preceding argument also implies that there cannot be two diﬀerent types
in D who are indiﬀerent between x0 and x1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let







We ﬁrst focus on what turns out to be the “interesting case” where no candidate can attract all of the
voters, i.e., suppose that H0(0) > H1(0) and H0(1) < H1(1). Continuity of H j, j = 0;1 therefore implies
that there exists ¯ t such that H0(¯ t) = H1(¯ t). Let ¯ xj, i = 0;1, be the output of public goods and ¯ aj be the
optimal allocation of the input, i.e.,









We now show that ¯ aj, i = 0;1 is an equilibrium.
Suppose by way of contradiction, that Candidate 1 can improve by deviating to producing ˆ x1. Let
D = {t|v(ˆ x1;t) ≥ v(¯ x0;t)}. If 1 ∈ D, then D is of the form [˜ t;1], where ˜ t ≥ ¯ t. (Suppose otherwise; then, by
Lemma 1, v(ˆ x1; ¯ t) > v(¯ x0; ¯ t), which contradicts (21), i.e., that x1 maximizes the utility of type ¯ t). Thus, a
deviation such that 1 ∈ D cannot increase Candidate 1’s winning probability, as the set of types that vote
for Candidate 1 is weakly smaller. Hence, the following claim completes the proof that Candidate 1 has
no proﬁtable deviation.
Claim 1. 1 ∈ D.
Figure 6 illustrates the intuition for the proof. The left panel of ﬁgure 6 illustrates the relationship
between type ¯ t’s indiﬀerence curve and the equilibrium production levels ¯ x0 and ¯ x1 of both candidates.
34Clearly, the indiﬀerence curve must be tangent to the transformation frontier at both points. Suppose
that ¯ x0 is to the right of ˜ x0 as depicted in the left panel. It is then immediate that type 0, whose dashed
indiﬀerence curve is steeper than that of type ¯ t, is strictly better oﬀ with ¯ x0 than with any public good
bundle that Candidate 1 could oﬀer. Hence type 0 would never vote for Candidate 1. Since D must either
contain type 0 or type 1 by Lemma 1, this implies that 1 ∈ D. Thus, in order to conclude the proof we
must exclude the scenario depicted in the right panel of ﬁgure 6, where ¯ x0 is to the left of ˜ x0. If the goods
are suﬃciently well substitutable, i.e., if (19) holds, then this limits the amount by which the MRS can
change along the indiﬀerence curve (the limit on the change of the MRS can be related to a lower bound
on the elasticity of substitution). In particular, suppose we move along the indiﬀerence curve of type ¯ t,
starting from ¯ x0 and ending at the intersection with the dashed line . If the MRS at this intersection is
still less than ∆, then ˜ x1 is above the indiﬀerence curve, as indicated in the right panel. This, however,
means that voter ¯ t is not indiﬀerent between the candidates. Candidate 1 could ﬁnd a policy, such as ˜ x1,
that would make ¯ t strictly prefer him, which cannot be the case in equilibrium. We now proceed to the
formal proof.


























  : (22)
Since ¯ xj satisﬁes (21) it follows that the marginal rate of substitution of voter ¯ t must equal negative of
the slope of the transformation frontier:








The maximum amount of good 0 that Candidate 1 can provide is 1













     : (24)
Similarly, the maximum amount of good 1 that Candidate 0 can provide is 0











     ; ˜ x1
1 = 0
1: (25)
For 0 ∈ D, we now show that ¯ x0
0 < ˜ x0
0 must hold. To see this, note that no point on the transformation
frontier of Candidate 1 is strictly preferred to ¯ x0 by voter ¯ t. The single crossing property (18) therefore
implies that v(x1;0) < v0(¯ x0;0) for any point x1 with x1
0 ≤ ¯ x0
0. Thus, a necessary condition for the
deviation to attract type 0 is that ¯ x0
0 < ˜ x0
0.
Let L = {˜ x0 + (1 − )˜ x1|0 <  < 1} be the open line segment connecting ˜ x0 and ˜ x1, so that
∆ = −
˜ x1
1 − ˜ x0
1
˜ x1
0 − ˜ x0
0
(26)
35is the (negative of the) slope of this line segment.
We next show that
MRS¯ t(˜ x1) ≥ ∆ (27)
Suppose by way of contradiction that MRS¯ t(˜ x1) < ∆. Then quasiconcavity of utility implies that
v(˜ x1; ¯ t) > v(x; ¯ t) for all x ∈ L: (28)
Recall that if 0 ∈ D then ¯ x0
0 < ˜ x0
0 must hold. Further, ˜ x1
0 < ¯ x0
0 since candidate 0 is better at providing
good 0. Thus, there exists x ∈ L with x ≥ ¯ x0. Monotonicity of preferences implies that v(¯ x0;t) <
v(˜ x1;t) ≤ v(¯ x1; ¯ t), where the last inequality follows from (28). Thus ¯ t is not indiﬀerent between the
candidates, and therefore not the cutoﬀ voter, a contradiction.


























Let (x1=x0)(MRS) be the good ratio x1=x0 on ¯ I as a function of the MRS. Since  is a lower bound for

















By deﬁnition (x1=x0)(MRS¯ t(¯ x0) = ¯ x0
1=¯ x1
1, i.e., the good ratio at which the MRS of type ¯ t is MRS¯ t(¯ x0)
must be ¯ x0
1=¯ x1
1. We have shown that ¯ x0
0 < ˜ x0
0 if 0 ∈ D. Thus, (x1=x0)(MRS¯ t(¯ x0) > (x1=x0)(MRS¯ t(˜ x0).
Further, as indicated in the right panel of ﬁgure 6, (x1=x0)(∆) < ˜ x1
1=˜ x1
0. In particular, by construction,
voter ¯ t is indiﬀerent between the candidates. Thus, ˜ x1 cannot be above indiﬀerence curve ¯ I. In order for
this to be the case, the slope of ¯ I at good ratio ˜ x1
1=˜ x1
0 must be at least ∆. Hence (32) implies















Substituting (29) and (30) into (33) contradicts (19). Thus, 1 ∈ D.















Finally note that the distribution of types does not aﬀect the equilibrium. This proves the ﬁrst state-
ment.
The case where H(0;c0) ≤ H(0;c1) or H(1;c0) ≥ H(1;c1).
Consider the ﬁrst of the two scenarios as the other case is similar. Let x1 be the consumption bundle
provided by Candidate 1 that maximizes type 0’s utility. Then v(x1;0) ≥ v(x;0) for any x ∈ TF0. The
single crossing property (18) immediately implies that v(x1;t) > v(x;t) for any x ∈ TF0 and for any t > 0
and hence all citizens t > 0 vote for Candidate 1 independently of Candidate 0’s strategy. Thus, (x0; x1) is






The next result shows that the equilibrium characterized in Theorem 1 is unique and strict, provided
that there is suﬃcient uncertainty about the position of the median voter type.
Theorem 2 Suppose that the conditions of Theorem 1 hold and that the distribution of the median voter
tm(!) has a strictly positive density on [0;1]. Then, one of the following is true:
1. The equilibrium is strict and it is the unique Nash equilibrium (pure or mixed).
2. One of the candidate wins with probability 1 and receives 100% of the votes in almost all states
! ∈ Ω.
Proof of Theorem 2. Proof of Part 2. Let (x0; x1) be the allocation of public goods oﬀered by the
candidates in a pure strategy equilibrium. By Lemma 1, D0 = {t|v(x0;t) ≥ v(x1;t)} and D1 = {t|v(x1;t) ≥
v(x0;t)} are intervals.
First, suppose that D0 = D1 = [0;1]. Clearly, each candidate’s winning probability is 0.5. Given the
single crossing property (18) this implies x0 = x1. Let tm(!) be the realization of the median voter type,
and let ˆ t be the median of the distribution of tm(!). Since 
j
j > i
j the transformation frontiers have dif-
ferent slopes. Thus, for at least one candidate MRSˆ t(xj) does not equal the slope of the candidate’s trans-
formation frontier. As a consequence, there exists a bundle of public goods ˆ xj for Candidate i such that
v(ˆ xj; ˆ t) > v(xj; ˆ t) = vˆ t(x−j). Thus, Lemma 1 implies that ˆ t is in the interior of ˆ D = {t|v(ˆ xj;t) ≥ v(x−j;t)}.
Given that ˆ D contains the median of the median voters in its interior, and given that the distribution of
37types has strictly positive density, the winning probability for Candidate j is strictly increased, a contra-
diction to the assumption that x0 = x1 is a Nash equilibrium. Hence, D0 and D1 cannot both be equal to
[0;1].
Next, suppose that Di consists of only a single, point, i.e., Di = {0} or Di = {1}. Continuity of
preferences then implies that no citizen in Di has a strict preferences for Candidate i, and all of them will
therefore abstain. Finally, since tm(!) = 0 or tm(!) = 1 with probability 0, this implies that the other
candidate will receive a strictly positive number of votes and therefore win 100% of all votes cast.
Thus, let Dj , [0;1] for i = 0;1. Further, by continuity of v there exists exactly one type t∗ for which
v(x0;t∗) = v(x1;t∗). Suppose by way of contradiction that H0(t∗) , v(x0;t∗), where H0 is deﬁned in (20).
If 0 ∈ D0 then Lemma 1 implies v(x0;0) > v(x1;0). Hence, there exists some ˜ x0 such that v(˜ x0;0) >
v(x1;0) and v(˜ x0;t∗) > v(x0;t∗) = v(x1;t∗). Thus, t∗ is in the interior of ˜ D0 = {t|v(˜ x0;t) ≥ v(x1;t)}. Since
0 ∈ ˜ D0 and ˜ D0 is an interval it follows that ˜ D0 is a strict superset of D0. Since the distribution of types
has strictly positive density, this implies that the winning probability for Candidate 0 strictly increases,
a contradiction. The proof where 1 ∈ D0 or agent 1 deviates is similar. Thus, the cutoﬀ voter t∗ at any
equilibrium must satisfy H0(t∗) = v(x0;t∗).
We now show that there exists exactly one t that solves H0(t) = H1(t). Suppose by way of contra-
diction that there exist t < t′ such that H0(t) = H1(t) and H0(t′) = H1(t′). Then the indiﬀerence curves
of type t’s and that of type t′ must be tangent both to TF0 and TF1. This, however, is only possible if the
indiﬀerence curves intersect at at least two points, contradicting the single crossing property (18).
Given that a unique t solves H0(t) = H1(t), the Nash equilibrium is unique among all pure strategy
Nash equilibria. Now suppose that there exists a mixed strategy equilibrium. Without loss of generality
suppose that Candidate 1 mixes. By selecting ¯ x0 Candidate 0 can ensure that at least all types t < ¯ t vote
for him. However, since Candidate 1 mixes, the candidate choose ¯ x1 with probability less than 1. In
such a case, there exists ˆ t > ¯ t such that all citizens t < ˆ t vote for Candidate 0, which strictly increases
Candidate 0’s winning probability as tm(!) has a strictly positive density. Thus, Candidate 0’s winning
probability in the mixed strategy equilibrium must be strictly larger than that in the pure strategy equilib-
rium. Similarly, it follows that Candidate 1’s winning probability in the mixed strategy equilibrium must
be at least as large as in the pure strategy equilibrium, a contradiction since the winning probabilities
must add up to 1.
Finally, the Nash equilibrium is strict since preferences are strictly quasiconcave and therefore the
solution to maximization problem (20) is unique. As a consequence, any deviation by Candidate 1 from
xj to ˜ xj implies that v¯ t(x−j) > v¯ t(˜ xj). Hence, Candidate i loses type ¯ t. Since the distribution of types has
a strictly positive density, this implies that Candidate i’s winning probability strictly decreases.
Proof of Proposition 3. Denote the cutoﬀ voter by ¯ t. Suppose Candidate 0 wins. Then the median voter
in state ! must be to the left of ¯ t, i.e., tm(!) < ¯ t. Consider the optimal budget allocation by Candidate 0


















which is equivalent to 






      0
0 − 0








< 0. Since we know from Theorem 1 that, in equilibrium, (36) holds for t = ¯ t, it
follows that (36) is positive for all t < ¯ t. This implies that all types t < ¯ t have an optimal level of a that
is greater than ¯ a0. The argument if Candidate 1 wins is analogous.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider the optimal budget allocation by Candidate 1 for a type t voter:
maxv(1
0a1;1
1(1 − a1);t); (37)











By (18), the left-hand side of (38) is decreasing in t. Moreover, since v is concave in both arguments, it
follows that the left-hand side of (38) is decreasing in a1. Thus, a voter with a higher type t has a lower
preferred value of a1. Since an increase in 0
0 or 0
1 moves the equilibrium cutoﬀ voter to the right (i.e.,
increases ¯ t), and we know from Proposition 1 that Candidate 1 chooses a1 to maximize the utility of the
new cutoﬀ voter, this proves the ﬁrst part of the theorem.
The equivalent condition to (38) for Candidate 0 is (36) in the proof of Proposition 3. Totally diﬀer-
entiating (36) with respect to 0










      da +




















      d0
1 = 0: (39)









< 0 and d¯ t
d0
1
> 0, so that the term in square brackets is negative. Thus, da0=d0
1 < 0, as
claimed.






























39The ﬁrst term in the numerator is the product of a negative and a positive number, while the second term




Proof of Proposition 5. Diﬀerentiating (9) with respect to a0 and a1 and canceling the respective






1(1 − a1)) − (0






1(1 − a1)) − (0
1(1 − a0))] = 0 (42)
Rearranging gives
































Rearranging gives equation (10) in the text. The remaining steps of the argument are in the main text.
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